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In the mid- 1960s, state legislatures began to encourage property
owners to make natural and rural areas available for appropriate
recreational activities, such as hiking, fishing and hunting, through
recreational use statutes.' Subsequently, all states have adopted
recreational use statutes with differing coverage of properties and
recreational activities.2 These statutes provide incentives for property
owners to allow others to use their property gratuitously by altering the
duties providers owe recreational users.' By redefining the duty of care,
the recreational use statutes make it less likely that a property owner
will be liable for damages to an injured recreational user.4 Given the
litigious nature of Americans, the reduction of the duty of care to keep
premises safe serves to promote recreational uses of private properties.'
In most state statutes, the duty owed recreational users is similar to the
duty owed to trespassers.6
I E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 846.1 (2001).
2 See infra App. 1.
3 See, e.g., John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal
Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective is the Protection?, 24 IND.
L. REV. 1587 (1991) (describing the recreational use statutes); Stuart J. Ford,
Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Towards Sharpening the Picture
at the Edges, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 491 (describing the purposes of recreational use
statutes and Wisconsin's evolution of statutory provisions); Martha L. Noble,
Recreational Access to Agricultural Land: Insurance Issues, 24 IND. L. REV. 1615
(1991) (discussing insurance issues with respect to recreational uses of land).
4 See, e.g., Robert D. Lee, Jr., Recreational Use Statutes and Private
Property in the 1990s, 13 J. PARK AND RECREATION ADMIN. 71 (1995) (enumerating
the meaning of the statutes' reconfiguration of the duty of care).
5 See, e.g., Joan M. O'Brien, Comment, The Connecticut Recreational Use
Statute: Should a Municipality be Immune from Tort Liability?, 15 PACE L. REV.
963, 988 (1994, 1995) (noting that even greater incentives may be needed).
6 E.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(a)(2) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2000) (stating that recreational users are not owed a greater degree of care
than a trespasser); see also Flye v. City of Waco, 50 S.W..3d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.
2001) (interpreting the Texas recreational use statute as limiting defendant's duty
to that owed to trespassers); Charpentier v. Von Geldern, 236 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that a landowner's duty under the California
recreational use statutes is no greater than that owed a trespasser).
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A prototype state recreational use statute was developed in
1965' and amended in 1979.8 However, the "fear of litigation"
continues to deter fuller access to private lands.9 Some recreational
areas may be underutilized due to the inability of existing legislation to
provide adequate protection against liability for recreational injuries."°
One impediment of many state recreational use statutes is a provision
that precludes recreational activity providers from receiving certain
types of compensation." Over one-half of the statutes contain
prohibitions on monetary consideration and most of the remaining
recreational use statutes preclude coverage if the property owner
charges an entry fee .12 Given prohibitions on monetary consideration
and charges collected by landowners, many landowners are not eligible
for protection under the state recreational statutes.
7 24 Counsel of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Public
Recreation on Private Lands: Limitations on Liability 150 - 152 (1965).
8 W. L. CHURCH, PRIVATE LANDS AND PUBLIC RECREATION: A REPORT AND
PROPOSED NEW MODEL ACT ON ACCESS, LIABILITY AND TRESPASS 1-34 (1979)
(describing the justifications for recreational use statutes).
9 See, e.g., James C. Kozlowski, Recklessness Reaffirmed, PARKS &
RECREATION, Oct. 1999, at 42 (observing a judicial recognition that fear of
litigation can curtail recreational and sport activities).
10 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Cal. 1990) (noting that
the statutory goal of the recreational use statute was to "constrain the growing
tendency of private landowners to bar public access to their land for recreational
uses out of fear of incurring tort liability" [cites omitted]).
I I E.g., "[t]he provisions of this section shall not limit the liability of a
landowner which may otherwise arise or exist when the landowner receives a fee for
use of the premises..." VA. CODE ANN. 3.1-509(D) (Michie 1994), repealed by
Acts 1970, c. 29.
12 See infra App. 2. See also, e.g., Prince v. City of Apache Junction, 912
P.2d 47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a team entry fee paid to the city was
consideration that disqualified the city from immunity under the recreational use
statute); Jansen v. Howard, 263 Cal. Rptr. 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(concluding a fee paid to enter a race was consideration that triggered the
"consideration exception" so that defendant could not claim the defense of the
recreational use statute); Piano v. City of Renton, 14 P.3d 871 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (finding a moorage fee disqualified the defendant from immunity under the
recreational use statute).
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While conceptual and case analyses have addressed distinctions
between admission fees and other monetary consideration, 13 recent
legislative changes adopted by various states in "shared responsibility
statutes"' 4 suggest that legislatures and the public have altered their
attitudes regarding immunity for persons providing recreational
activities. 5 Given the protection afforded to private sport activities,
thought might be given to revising recreational use statutes to allow
limited amounts of compensation.16
This article is a statutory comparison that offers suggestions for
encouraging private landowners to make properties available to others
for recreational activity purposes. After discussing a few historic
specifications provided by recreational use statutes, an analysis of the
strategies of shared responsibility statutes discloses a legislative
willingness to grant liability protection to profit-making businesses.
Through carefully drawn exceptions, recreational activity providers
may be granted immunity from liability without compromising the
claims of recreational users who deserve compensation for injuries.
Greater allowance of compensation may enable more providers to
qualify for protection under a recreational use statute.
Traditional Statutes
Recreational use statutes were enacted to reduce situations in
which qualifying recreational providers could incur liability for
13 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 77-78 (agreeing with the prohibition of
remuneration but noting exceptions for improvements or indirectly levied charges);
see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Howard P. Benard, Little League Fun, Big League Liability, 8
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 93, 131 (1997) (noting the need of statutes to shield volunteer
coaches from liability).
16 See, e.g., Terrence J. Centner, Tort Liability for Sports and Recreational
Activities: Expanding Statutory Immunity for Protected Classes and Activities, 26
J. LEGIS. 1 (2000) (discussing immunity statutes including those for commercial
sport activities).
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damages to injured participants.' 7 Persons making lands available to
others do not owe recreational users a duty of care to keep premises
safe. ' Some recreational use statutes say that recreational providers do
not need to give warning of dangerous conditions, structures, or
activities. 9 Due to the dissipation of the common law standard of care
in qualifying situations, and the duty to give warnings, recreational
activity providers may escape liability for negligence.2"
Individual state recreational use statutes have digressed from
their historic model so that general rules applying to all state statutes are
difficult to prescribe. Preconditions are set forth as qualifications and
exceptions." Litigation concerning the statutory provisions of
recreational use statutes show an ambiguous set of rules that may
operate to frustrate the opening of private lands for recreation uses.22
17 E.g., ALA. CODE § 35-15-20 (1991). It is hereby declared.., that it is in
the public interest to encourage owners of land to make such areas available to the
public for non-commercial recreational purposes by limiting such owners' liability
towards persons entering thereon for such purposes; that such limitation on liability
would encourage owners of land to allow non-commercial public recreational use
of land which would not otherwise be open to the public.... Id.
18 E.g., the Virginia statute says that landowners do not "[i]mpliedly or
expressly represent that the premises are safe . . " VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-
509(C)(1) (Michie 1997).
19 E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
20 See, e.g., Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329,1331,1336
(Conn. 1993) (finding a municipal corporation to be immune from negligence claims
due to the state recreational use statute); Robbins v. Great Northern Paper Co., 557
A.2d 614, 616 (Me. 1989) (finding that plaintiffs' negligence claims were defeated
by the recreational use statute); Hoye v. Illinois Power Company, 646 N.E.2d 651
(111. App. Ct. 1995) (finding defendants immune from plaintiffs' negligence actions
under the recreational use statute).
21 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509(D) (Michie 1997). Nothing contained
in this section, except as provided in subsection E, shall limit the liability of a
landowner which may otherwise arise or exist by reason of his gross negligence or
willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity.... VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509(D) (Michie 1997).
22 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 3, at 1613 (recommending that recreational
use statutes be clarified to eliminate ambiguities); Jan Lewis, Recreational Use
Statutes: Ambiguous Laws Yield Conflicting Results, TRIAL Dec. 1991, at 68
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Plaintiff litigation and arguments about various issues under
recreational use statutes have prompted a few courts to express remarks
on the statutory coverage. In considering injuries to passengers in a
four-wheel-drive, multipurpose vehicle, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that "[t]he Legislature may exercise its policy choice to modify,
limit or expand this special immunity if it wishes in light of the
empirical data, the evolution of the precedents and the competing policy
objectives ofthe legislation."23 The court then retreated from an earlier
pronouncement24 to deny defendants summary judgment because it was
not clear whether the plaintiffs were engaged in a recreational purpose.2
In considering an accident injuring a child playing on a vacant
lot, an Indiana court was prompted to note that "it is precisely liability
for these types of tragic events from which the land owner is protected
under the [recreational use statute]."26 While distinctions among states'
recreational statutes create a confusing array of rules, a few highlights
about providers, activities, and residual liability are offered to help set
the stage for an analysis of expanding terms governing compensation.
Providers and their Premises
Most recreational use statutes apply to property owners, lessees,
tenants, occupants, and persons controlling premises 27 so that the term
"recreational activity provider" or "provider" can be used to discuss to
(arguing that an ambiguity of the type of land qualifying for immunity has led to
contradictory interpretations of provisions); J. Brandon McWherter, Comment,
Parent v. State: Tennessee's Recreational Use Statute and Its Effects on Liability,
30 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 671, 684 (2000) (noting that with every court decision
addressing a recreational use statute, landowners gain a clearer understanding of
what the statute offers them).
23 Famham v. Kittinger, 634 N.E.2d 162, 166 (N.Y. 1994) (considering the
applicability of N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1989)).
24 lannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 542 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1989).
25 Farnham, 634 N.E.2d at 167.
26 Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (considering a child's injury on defendant's property from a limb which
siblings had lifted but accidentally dropped on the child).
27 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-729(2) (Supp. 1999).
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whom they apply. Recreational use statutes grant protection whenever
a provider-defendant uses the statute as an affirmative defense and
meets the statutory preconditions.28
The intent of recreational statutes was to limit the liability of
private landowners 29 in rural settings.3" However, with the demise of
sovereign immunity and the rise of accidents at public recreational
facilities, many states have broadened their statutes.3 Recreational use
statutes have diverse provisions on providers' properties that qualify for
the statutory immunity. Some statutes continue to limit the immunity
to owners of large tracts of land,32 and courts have found that accidents
occurring at developed recreational facilities do not qualify for the
immunity proffered by the recreational use statute.33
Interpretations of other statutes show that their provisions apply
to developed recreational facilities, such as ball fields, parks, and
swimming pools.34 Generally, a state's recreational use statute does not
28 See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 5, at 973 (discussing the Connecticut
statute).
29 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Kestenband, Note, Conway v. Town of Wilton:
Statutory Construction, Stare Decisis, and Public Policy in Connecticut's
Recreational Use Statute, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 1091 (1998) (analyzing a court's
decision that the Connecticut statute did not apply to municipal property).
30 See, e.g., Toogood v. St. Andrews at Valley Brook Condominium Ass'n.,
712 A.2d 1262, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1998) (noting that the New Jersey
recreational use statute had been intended to apply to rural settings).
31 E.g., the Illinois recreational use statute defines owner to include "the
possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State
of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises." 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2 (West 1993).
32 See, e.g., Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329, 1334 (Conn.
1993) (finding the state recreational use statute covered a ball field).
33 See, e.g., Sena v. Town of Greenfield, 696 N.E.2d 996, 999 (N.Y. 1998)
(finding that the immunity of the recreational use statute did not apply to a
supervised public park); Stone v. York Haven Power Co., 749 A.2d 452, 455-56
(Pa. 2000) (concluding that the recreational use statute does not provide immunity
to accidents occurring on improved recreational facilities).
34 Scrapchansky, 627 A.2d at 1335-36 (finding that a baseball field qualified
as premises covered by the recreational use statute); Cooley v. City of Carrollton,
579 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (granting a city summary judgment regarding
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apply to owners of suburban residential property35 or land utilized for
storage.36 However, in Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc.,37 an
Indiana court found that a state recreational use statute applied to an
accident occurring on a vacant lot.3" Given that the neighboring
children had been using the lot to play baseball, the court found a
recreational use and applied the recreational use statute to defeat the
claim for damages.39
Another issue has been whether a person qualifies as a provider
when they occupy property under a permit. A case from California,
Hubbard v. Brown,4" considered the question of whether a permit
holder occupying federal land for grazing purposes could be liable for
an accident to a motorcycle driver.4' The rancher had strung a barbed
wire fence and gate across a roadway to control his cattle.42 The injured
motorcyclist sued in negligence, and the defendant raised the
recreational use statute43 as his defense.4 In a lengthy opinion, the court
found that amendments to the California statute had expanded coverage
to include owners of easements and of revocable permits, and that the
holder of a permit to graze livestock had a sufficient interest in real
property to come within the statute's immunity.
45
alleged negligence at a swimming pool); Bonewell v. City of Derby, 693 P.2d 1179,
1181-82 (Kan. 1984) (finding a ball field in a city park qualified as premises
covered by the recreational use statute); Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick, 827 P.2d
329,331 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a city qualified for summary judgment for
an accident involving a playground toy).
35 Toogood, 712 A.2d at 1265-66.
36 Ornelas v. Randolph, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 214, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding property where equipment was stored had no legitimate recreational use).
37 Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1002 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999).
38 Id. at 1006.
39 Id.
40 Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1990).
41 Id at 1184.
42 Id.
43 CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West 1982).
44 Hubbard, 785 P.2d at 1184.
45 Id. at 1187.
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This result might be contrasted with Stramka v. Salt River
Recreation, Inc.,46 an Arizona case involving a defendant operating an
inner tube rental service under a permit with the United States Forest
Service.47 The injured plaintiff sued for negligence and the defendant
claimed immunity under the state recreational use statute. 48 The court
found that the defendant was not an "owner, occupant or lessee" of the
site of the accident, thus the defendant did not qualify for immunity.49
Activities Covered
Recreational use statutes generally contain qualifications as to
the types of recreational activities that are governed by the statutory
standard ofcare. Courts have concluded that persons entering property
to engage in activities distinct from those activities enumerated in the
recreational use statute are not recreational users.5 ° For example, in
Smith v. Arizona Board of Regents,5 jumping on a trampoline was
found not to be a recreational use covered by the Arizona statute.52
Consistent with the Smith decision, another Arizona court concluded
that a woman who entered a public park to work for a food. vendor
serving food at a civic event was not a recreational user.53 The court
determined that the nature and purpose of the activity should be used to
determine whether a property user is a recreational user.
54
Not everyone engaged in a recreational activity qualifies for
statutory immunity. In McMillan v. Parker," the plaintiff was on the
46 Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc., 877 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994).
47 Id. at 1340.
48 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (West 1990) (subsequently amended).
49 Stramka, 877 P.2d at 1342.
50 Smith v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 986 P.2d 247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999);
Herman v. City of Tucson, 4 P.3d 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
51 Smith, 986 P.2d at 252.
52 Id. (analyzing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551(C)(4)).
53 Herman, 4 P.3d at 975, 978.
54 Id at 979.
55 McMillan v. Parker, 910 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App. 1995).
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defendant's property to view wild boars.56 The defendant argued that
this was a recreational activity, but the court disagreed." The court
found the plaintiffto be a social guest so that the recreational use statute
was inapplicable.58
In another Texas case, Torres v. City of Waco,59 a court
considered the issue of whether the recreational use statute applied to a
particular recreational activity.6' A child was injured when a volleyball
stand fell on her while she was attending an after-school program.6 The
property owner, a governmental entity, claimed immunity under the
Texas recreational use-statute. 62 The court opined that while the after-
school program involved recreational activities, its activities went
beyond those enumerated by the recreational use statute. 63 Thus, the
property owner was not entitled to summary judgment.64
The Georgia Supreme Court was presented the unique question
of whether the defense of the state's recreational use statute65 applied to
the bombing in the Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Olympic
Games.66 The plaintiffs argued that the availability of the park was to
further a commercial enterprise so that the statutory defense was not
available.67 After reviewing cases from other states, the court employed
a balancing test to determine whether the activities qualified under the
state statute. 68 Given that the trial court had not considered all of the
appropriate social and economic factors, it was held that summary
56 Id. at 617.
57 Id. at 618.
59 Id. at 619.
59 Torres v. City of Waco, 51 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App. 2001).
60 Id. at 817.
61 ld. at 814.
62 Id at 820.
63 Id. at 821 (analyzing TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.001(3)
(West 1997)).
64 Id. at 822.
65 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-26 (1982).
66 Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 537 S.E,2d 345
(Ga. 2000).
67 Id. at 349.
68 Id.
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judgment for the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was not
61appropriate.
Residual Liability
Recreational use statutes, however, do not remove all duties
owed by recreational providers. Some allegations remain actionable
despite a recreational use statute. A statute may not apply to allegations
of negligent supervision. Others may exist due to attractive nuisance or
failure to meet the standard of care owed trespassers.
A recent case from Maine shows residual liability for failure to
supervise.7" In Dickinson v. Clark, the plaintiff was injured while
loading a wood splitter.7' Because the Maine recreational use statute
covers the harvesting or gathering of forest products,72 which may
include firewood,73 the plaintiff did not allege the premise's liability.
Instead, the plaintiff alleged "negligent supervision and instruction on
the use of the splitter.. . ."" The court found that this claim was not
precluded by the recreational use statute.75
Another question about the scope ofa recreational use statute is
whether it precludes claims based on the doctrine of attractive
nuisances. The prevalent response is that such claims survive. In City
of Indianapolis v. Johnson,77 an Indiana court found that the
recreational use statute did not affect a claim based on an attractive
69 Id.
70 Dickinson v. Clark, 767 A.2d 303 (Me. 2001).
71 Id. at 304.
72 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A(I)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
73 The court declined to determine whether the splitting of logs to produce
firewood qualified as "the harvesting or gathering of forest . . .products."
Dickinson, 767 A.2d at 306.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38A-4 (1999); see also Jacobsen v. City of
Rathdrum, 766 P.2d 736 (Idaho 1988); City of Indianapolis v. Johnson, 736 N.E.2d
295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
77 Johnson, 736 N.E. at 295.
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nuisance."8 An Idaho court reached the same result.7 9 Conversely, the
Wisconsin statute specifically provides for the opposite result.8" The
attractive nuisance doctrine is not available against defendants that
qualify under the recreational use statute in that state. 1
Most statutes assert that persons providing recreational activities
incur liability for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against
a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. 2 This means that an
allegation by an injured plaintiffthat the defendant willfully disregarded
the plaintiffs safety may present an issue for determination by the
court.8 3 Yet courts can determine as a matter of law that the facts fail
to allege any willful or malicious conduct." Landowners allowing
others to come onto their properties need to discuss with users any
special conditions that might lead to an accident.8 5
78 Id. at 298.
79 Jacobsen, 766 P.2d at 742 (noting that the recreational use statute does not
preclude application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance, but the doctrine was not
proven for this case); see also Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d
1002, 1006-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the attractive nuisance exception
to the recreational use statute).
80 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(7) (West 2000).
I1 See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling Co., 627 N.W.2d
527, 537 (Wis. 2001) (noting that the recreational use statute precludes recovery
under the doctrine of attractive nuisance).
82 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-4 (West 2000).
3 See, e.g., Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 4 P.3d 965, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999) (finding that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that the property
owner's conduct was grossly negligent so that summary judgment for the property
owner was affirmed).
84 See, e.g., Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 537
S.E.2d 345, 349 (Ga. 2000) (granting summary judgment to defendants on claims
that they had acted willfully or maliciously); Bird v. Economy Brick Homes, Inc.,
498 N.W.2d 408,410 (Iowa 1993) (concluding that there was no issue of willful or
malicious conduct); Bragg v. Genesee County Agric. Society, 644 N.E.2d 1013,
1018 (1994) (granting summary judgment in the absence of evidence of malice or
willful intent by defendants).
85 See, e.g., John G. Pike and S. Charles Neill, Hunting Liability in Kansas:
Premises Liability and the Kansas Recreational Use Statute, 38 WASHBURN L.J.
831, 836-838 (1999) (discussing the need for landowners to give information on
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Expansion of Compensation under Prototype Revisions
Recreational use statutes initially incorporated a "Good
Samaritan" qualification under which immunity was available only
when the provider gratuitously provided.land and water areas to users
for recreational activities.' Although state restrictions against charges
have been eroding, most recreational use statutes enunciate admission
fees or consideration as prohibited compensation.87 Thus, a provider
needs to meet the qualification of not collecting a fee or compensation
to qualify for the statutory defense." A few statutes pronounce that
their coverage is only for providers who permit noncommercial
recreational use of lands.8 9 Remuneration is permitted under these
statutes so long as there is no commercial recreational use.
With the redrafting of the prototype in 1979, a new definition of
"charge" relaxed the compensation prohibition traditionally
incorporated in recreational use statutes. 9 Three exceptions delineated
by the prototype are noteworthy due to their potential to expand the
situations where recreational activity providers can qualify for the
protection afforded by a recreational use statute: (1) benefits related to
property conditions to persons using their properties).
86 See, e.g., Kathryn D. Homing, Comment, The End of Innocence: The
Effect ofCalifornia's Recreational Use Statute on Children at Play, 32 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 857, 860 (citing the 1965 suggested legislation by the Council of State
Governments).
87 See infra App. 2.
88 See, e.g., Prince v. City of Apache Junction, 912 P.2d 47 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (finding that a team entry fee paid to the city was consideration that
disqualified the city from immunity under the recreational use statute); Jansen v.
Howard, 263 Cal. Rptr. 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding a fee paid to
enter a race was consideration that triggered the "consideration exception" so that
defendant could not claim the defense of the recreational use statute); Piano v. City
of Renton, 14 P.3d 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (finding a moorage fee disqualified
the defendant from immunity under the recreational use statute).
89 E.g., "[e]xcept as specifically recognized by or provided in this article, an
owner ofoutdoor recreational land who permits non-commercial public recreational
use of such land owes no duty of care ..." ALA. CODE § 35-15-22 (1991).
90 CHURCH, supra note 8, at 12.
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the recreational use, (2) compensation for land conservation, and (3)
governmental and nominal payments. 9' Because not all state
legislatures have incorporated these exceptions into their recreational
use statutes, an investigation of statutory provisions can address the
merits of whether the liability protection afforded by recreational use
statutes might be expanded.
Charges for Benefits and Participation
While charges consisting of admission fees for permission to go
upon land often prevent a provider from qualifying for the protection of
a recreational use statute,92 charges that are not admission fees may be
allowed.93 Two major categories of charges may be sanctioned by a
particular recreational use statute: benefits and fees for participation.
Some recreational use statutes list "benefits to or arising from
the recreational use" as an exception to the fee prohibition. 94 An Illinois
court considered the meaning of this clause in Hoye v. Illinois Power
Company," a lawsuit relating to injuries from a boating accident. In
Hoye, a quadriplegic plaintiffalleged that the defendant did not qualify
for the protection of the recreational use statute due to the receipt of rent
and a percentage of concession and docking fees from a marina.96
Assuming that the defendant had collected such monies, the Hoye court
found that the defendant had not collected "a fee for admission to the
91 CHURCH, supra note 8, at 12-14.
92 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.18 (West 1996); see also Huth v. Ohio
Dep't of Natural Res., 413 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ohio 1980) (finding that the
payment of an admission fee meant there was no recreational user so the recreational
use statute was not applicable to the mishap).
93 E.g., "'[ciharge' means an admission fee for permission to go upon the
land, but does not include: the sharing of game, fish or other products of
recreational use; or benefits to or arising from the recreational use; or contributions
in kind, services or cash made for the purpose of properly conserving the land." 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(d) (West 1993).
94 Id.
95 Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646 N.E.2d 651 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
96 Id at 652.
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land."97 Without an admission fee, the defendant qualified for the
protection afforded by the Illinois recreational use statute.98
Registration fees charged for persons to participate in a
recreational activity may be found to be distinct from admission fees.
In Seich v. Town of Canton,99 a parent was injured while attending a
daughter's basketball game. The town had charged a registration fee
for participation in its youth basketball league to defray the costs of the
players' t-shirts, referees, necessary athletic equipment, and expenses for
custodians.0 The court found that the parents were participants in a
recreational use and had not been charged an admission fee.'0 ' Thus,
the recreational use statute applied and the town was immune from suit
for the injuries.0 2 A Georgia court followed this logic in Quick v.
Stone Mountain Memorial Association,0 3 holding that a fee for
parking is not a fee for admission.4 Similarly, under the Nebraska
recreational statute, charges to enter land disqualify providers from
immunity.' 5 In a case involving an injured camper, a Nebraska court
concluded that a rental fee paid by a school to use a camp was not a
charge because it was a rental.0 6
Thesejudicial interpretations show that the statutory exception
allowing activity providers to collect benefits related to a recreational
use enables providers to structure compensation as payment for
something other than an admission fee. The ability to receive benefits
other than admission fees significantly broadens the category of
recreational activity providers who can qualify for the protection of a
recreational use statute.
97 Id. at 654.
98 Id. (considering 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/6(b)(West 1992)).
Seich v. Town of Canton, 686 N.E.2d 981 (Mass. 1997).
100 Id. at 982.
101 Id. at 983.
102 Id.
103 Quick v. Stone Mountain Mem'l Assoc., 420 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992).
104 Id. at 38.
105 NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-729 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
106 Teters v. Scottsbluff Public Schools, 567 N.W.2d 314,326 (Neb. Ct. App.
1997).
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Compensation for Land Conservation
In recognition that recreational properties might benefit from
land conservation measures, the 1979 prototype authorized
contributions in kind and services or cash to help a provider with land
conservation measures.0 7 Such compensation would not operate to
defeat the liability protection offered providers under the recreational
use statute. Some state statutes couch such compensation as permitted
for wildlife management.0 8 This allows recreational participants and
others to provide services for the removal of brush or trees, or to plant
flora that would provide an improved habitat for a recreational purpose.
Moreover, the 1979 prototype does not restrict compensation for
land conservation to services. Donations of money for land
conservation are condoned."0 9 Since the protection of many state
recreational use statutes is not available when there is an admission fee,
a provision allowing funds to be paid for land conservation enlarges the
class of providers who qualify for statutory immunity.
Governmental Payments and Nominal Sums
Public utilities and other landowners sometimes lease lands to
governments for use as recreational or park lands. The lessor property
owners may thereby receive compensation. The 1979 prototype
recognized this possibility and provided an exception under which
providers of such lands would qualify for the protection ofa recreational
use statute."' A large number of states have incorporated a provision
under which the duties and liabilities of landowners who lease lands to
the state or other government entities are those prescribed by the
107 CHURCH, supra note 8, at 20-21.
108 E.g.,"services rendered for the purpose of wildlife management...." IND.
CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-2(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 2000).
109 CHURCH, supra note 8, at 20-21. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §
895.52(6)(a)3 (West Supp. 2000) (allowing a donation of money for the
conservation of resources).
It o CHURCH, supra note 8, at 14.
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recreational use statute. l"' In a different manner, some recreational use
statutes assert that remuneration received from the state or other
government shall not be deemed to be a charge within the meaning of
the statute."12 Under this provision, the payment of governmental
monies for idling agricultural land would not disqualify a landowner
from the protection of a recreational use statute.
Several recreational use statutes recognize that nominal sums
paid to recreational activity providers should not disqualify providers
from the protection afforded by recreational use statutes. "' The state of
Wisconsin adopted a broad exception." 4 Not only can a recreation
provider collect up to $2,000 during a year, but compensation of gifts
of products, compensation for conservation of resources, and payments
from governmental bodies are not included in determining this dollar
figure.' ' The Wisconsin configuration provides protection for property
owners despite their receipt of nominal compensation.
Strategy for Relaxing Liability Provisions
Perhaps one of the most significant developments concerning
statutory immunity despite the receipt of compensation is the enactment
of legislative immunity provisions called "shared responsibility statutes"
for businesses and persons providing specialized risky sport activities. 6
III E.g., "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of §§ 5-1 103 and
5-1104 are applicable to any duty and liability of an owner of land leased to the
State or any of its political subdivisions for any recreational or educational
purpose." MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. 1, § 5-1105 (2000).
112 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-6(2) (West 1994).
113 E.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(d) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §
14-22-10-2.5(2)(B) (Michie Supp. 2000).
114 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West 2000).
115 Id.
116 E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 05.45.01OC.210 (Michie 2000) (skiing); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. §§ 5-701 to -706 (Supp. 2000) (skiing); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-554
(Supp. 2000) (baseball); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (West 1999)
(baseball); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (West 1998) (skiing);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § § 29-211 to -214 (West 1990) (skiing); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-4-280 to -283 (Supp. 2000) (fishing); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-43 (Supp.
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The objectives of these new statutes are to encourage safety, reduce
injury litigation, and stabilize economic conditions for a sport
2000) (roller skating); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (Michie 1998) (skiing);
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1201 to -1206 (Michie 1998) (outfitters and guides); 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 52/1 to 52/99 (West & Supp. 2001) (hockey facilities); 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 72/1 to 72/30 (West Supp. 2001) (roller skating); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-31-6-1 to -4 (Michie 1998) (roller skating); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
8, §§ 601C608 (West 1997) (roller skating); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§
801C806 (West Supp. 2000) (amusement rides); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§
15201C15227 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (skiing); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
143, §§ 71 (H)C7 I(S) (West 1991 & Supp. 200 1) (skiing); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 408.321C.344 (West 1999) (skiing); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
445.1721C. 1726 (West Supp. 2001) (roller skating); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
691.1541 C. 1544 (West 2000) (sport shooting); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-651 to
-655 (1999) (snowmobiling); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to -736 (1999)
(skiing); NEV. REV. STAT. 455A.010C.190 (1999) (skiing); NEV. REV. STAT.
455B.010C.100 (1999) (amusement rides); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:1 to
-A:26 (1989) (skiing); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-1 to - I I (West 1996) (skiing); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1 to -7 (West 1996) (roller skating); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
15-1 to -14 (Michie 2000) (skiing); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 18-101 to -107
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2001) (skiing); N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 865C868
(McKinney 1988) (skiing); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (1999) (skiing); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 99E- 10 to -14 (1999) (roller skating); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-09-01
to -11 (1999) (skiing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01 C.99 (West 1994 & Supp.
2001) (skiing); OHIOREV. CODEANN. §§ 4171.0 IC.10 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001)
(roller skating); OR. REV30.970C.990 (1988 & Supp. 1998) (skiing); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (West 1998) (skiing); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4
(1997) (skiing); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-21-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) (ice
and roller skating); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-20A-21 to -23 (Michie 1998)
(snowmobiling); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-114-101 to -107 (1996) (skiing); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 759.001C.005 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (roller
skating); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 760.001C.006 (Vernon Supp.
2001) (ice skating); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -3 (Supp. 2000) (sport
shooting); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1996) (skiing); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 1036CI038 (Supp. 1999) (skiing), WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§
79A.45.010 - .060 (West Supp. 2001) (skiing); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8
(Michie 1996) (skiing); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (1996) (whitewater
rafting); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 2001) (recreational sports);
WYO. STAT. § 6-9-301 (Michie 2001) (skiing).
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industry." 7 Most common are statutory provisions for skiing" 8 and
horseback riding. 9 A few states have enacted a shared responsibility
statute for fishing, 21 outfitters and guides, 121 whitewater rafting, "'22
snowmobiling,123 roller skating,'24 and sport shooting. 25 These statutes
are called shared responsibility statutes because they designate
responsibilities for persons providing sport activities and for
participants.
The major thrust of shared responsibility statutes is to curtail
liability and lawsuits related to injuries from the inherent risks of sport
activities. 126 Under the statutes, participants assume the burden for
injuries from inherent risks while engaging in the sport. 12' The inherent
risks of a sport are those dangers or conditions that are an integral part
11J7 Barr v. Mt. Brighton, 546 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. App. 1996).
118 See, e.g., Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent
Risks: Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act- An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV.
249 (1998) (examining a recreational safety statute that is written as a shared
responsibility statute).
119 See, e.g., Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A
Discussion of Those in Existence and Suggestions for a ModelAct, 83 KY. L.J. 157
(1994) (explaining new laws regulating liability for equine activities); Terence J.
Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997 (1995)
(classifying the laws regulating liability for equine accidents); Terence J. Centner,
Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good
Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 U. ARK. L. REV. 637 (1998)
(describing the grant of immunity in relation to equine accidents).
120 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-280 to -283 (Supp. 2001).
121 E.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1201 to -1206 (Michie 1998).
122 E.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (1996).
123 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-651 to -655 (1999).
124 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1 to -7 (West 1996).
125 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -3 (Supp. 2000).
126 See Cathy Hansen and Steve Duerr, Recreational Injuries & Inherent
Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND& WATER L. REV. 149, 168-73
(1993) (discussing the Wyoming ski statute that declined to define duties or
delineate specific inherent risks).
127 E.g., "[a] skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent
risks of skiing.. ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:13-5 (West 1996).
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of the sport. 2 Because ofthe statutory directives concerning inherent
risks, participants assume responsibility for many obvious and necessary
dangers.1 29 Legislative bodies have deemed these commercial activities
constitute special situations so that the prohibition of a fee is no longer
a necessary or appropriate precondition for immunity. 3 °
Given the protection against liability provided commercial
operators under the shared responsibility statutes, interest groups and
legislatures may want to assess the prohibitions against remuneration in
recreational use statutes. Through minor amendments to a state
recreational use statute, the existing prohibition against compensation
could be relaxed. While the above discourse defining the expansion of
compensation permitted by the 1979 recreational use prototype
acknowledges ideas that may be appropriate for some states, additional
situations can be identified under which statutory exceptions could
allow activity providers to receive remuneration without defeating the
statutory protection.
128 E.g., inherent risks for roller skaters may include "injuries which result
from incidental contact with other roller skaters or spectators, injuries which result
from falls caused by loss of balance, and injuries which involve objects or artificial
structures properly within the intended path of travel of the roller skater, which are
not otherwise attributable to a rink operator's breach of his duties.. ." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:14-6 (West 1996).
129 E.g., each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the
dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary.
Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from
variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks,
trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and
their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible
snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.342
(West 1999).
130 E.g., "[t]he Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large
number of citizens of this State and also attracts to this State large numbers of
nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this State and, therefore,
the allocation of the risks and costs of skiing are an important matter of public
policy." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:13-1(a) (West 1996).
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Discussion of Further Dispensation
Although prohibitions on entry fees and consideration serve as
a general rule, exceptions can allow minor compensation without
compromising qualification under a recreational use statute. Four
contemporary exceptions show novel provisions to encourage
dispensation for providers opening their properties for recreational
purposes: (1) contributions to offset educational costs, (2) tax-based
compensation for agricultural land, (3) fees for game rights, and (4) a
liability ceiling with insurance coverage for agricultural properties.
Contributions to Offset Educational Costs
North Carolina allows private recreational providers to qualify
for the defense of the recreational use statute whenever educational
services are involved.' 3' A more limited exception is delineated by the
Arizona recreational use statute. 132 Contributions that offset costs of
educational or recreational premises and services are permitted for
public entities and nonprofit corporations without affecting the statutory
protection for these groups. 133 The North Carolina and Arizona statutes
show that contributions for educational services could be added as a
statutory exception that would not disqualify an activity provider from
the protection of the recreational use statute. With this exception, more
providers might be encouraged to make their private lands available for
educational purposes.
Tax-based Compensation for Agricultural Land
The Texas recreational use statute deviates significantly from
the prohibition against compensation. "34 Recreational activity providers
of agricultural land may charge for entry to their premises and qualify
for the statutory protection so long as the total charges are less than four
131 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to 38A-4 (1999).
132 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (2000).
133 Id.
134 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.00 1C.4 (Vernon 2000).
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times the total amount of ad valorem taxes imposed on the premises the
previous year.'35 Other providers of recreational lands may qualify for
the protection of the statute if their total charges are less than twice the
total amount of ad valorem taxes.'36 Agricultural lands are defined
broadly to include the production of plants, forestry lands, and the
production of animals.'
These tax-based compensation provisions show a desire to allow
persons to qualify for protection despite collecting entry charges, but a
desire that the charges be circumscribed. Ad valorem taxes of the
premises are recognized as a benchmark for determining the limit.
Under this policy, more valuable properties can collect greater amounts
and still qualify for the protection afforded by the Texas recreational use
statute.
Fees for Game Rights
One recreational pursuit intended to be encouraged by
recreational use statutes was hunting on private lands. Given the
prohibition against admission fees in most recreational use statutes,
landowners allowing others to hunt or collect game on their property
cannot collect rental monies and still qualify for the statutory protection.
Without the ability to charge rent, it is unclear how much incentive a
recreational use statute offers property owners to allow others to hunt
or catch game on their property.
An exception to this fee prohibition is provided by a Georgia
hunting law3 . that is distinct from the Georgia recreational use
statute.139 A provision in Georgia's hunting law provides that "[a]ny
owner of land, lessee of land, or lessee of the game rights to land who
gives permission to another person to hunt upon the land with or
without charge shall be entitled to the same protection from civil
135 Id. at § 75.003(c)(2)(B).
136 Id. at § 75.003(c)(2)(A).
137 Id. at § 75.001(1).
138 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1 (1997).
139 Id. at §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (1982).
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liability provided by [the Georgia recreational use statute] .... ,t40
Thus, although the recreational use statute does not acknowledge that
persons can collect fees for hunting and qualify for the statutory
protection, this is possible due to the protection afforded landowners
under Georgia's hunting law. The protection delineated by the Georgia
law suggests that a state's law could be structured so that charges for
fishing, trapping, and other activities would not exclude coverage of the
recreational use statute.
Liability Ceiling with Insurance Coverage
The Texas Legislature also considered liability of owners of
agricultural land in context of a limitation on the amount that injured
recreational users can recover. The Texas recreational use statute
contains a provision limiting monetary damages for qualifying private
landowners of agricultural land to $500,000 for each person and $1
million for each occurrence of bodily injury or death. 4' Separate from
the personal injury lid, there also is a limit for injury to or destruction
of property of $100,000 for each occurrence."4
Private landowners only qualify for this protection if they have
adequate liability insurance coverage to compensate injuries occurring
on their property. The insurance coverage under the Texas statute needs
to be in the amount of $1 million for each occurrence. 143 Thus, the
liability ceiling is conditioned on the existence of substantial insurance
monies for recreational injuries. In this manner, activity providers could
secure insurance and qualify for the protection of the recreational use
statute.
140 Id. at § 27-3-1 (1997).
141 TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.004(a) (Vernon 2000).
142 Id.
143 Id. at § 75.004(b).
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Conclusion
The comparison of various provisions of state recreational
statutes shows disparities in the treatment of compensation as a qualifier
for liability protection. While most statutes preclude protection for
persons collecting admission fees or other monetary consideration, other
provisions allow qualified compensation. Yet, given recent statutory
developments for specific recreational sports such as skiing and
horseback riding, greater thought might be given to expanding the
protection afforded by recreational use statutes. Through appropriate
revisions, additional private property owners might qualify for the
dispensation provided by recreational use statutes.
Additional provisions could allow recreational activity providers
to collect ancillary compensation without being disqualified from the
protection afforded by the statute. Recreational activity providers might
be able to receive contributions to offset educational costs associated
with the public use of the property. For agricultural and natural areas,
a tax-based exception could allow limited compensation as admission
fees. For specific recreational pursuits such as hunting and fishing,
special provision could be made to allow nominal fees for these
activities without disqualifying landowners from the protection of the
recreational use statute. If landowners have adequate insurance to cover
recreational injuries, they might be eligible for protection against
damages in excess of the insurance coverage.
By incorporating these exceptions into a recreational use statute,
a legislature might be more successful in encouraging private property
owners to make their properties available for outdoor recreational
activities.
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Appendix 1: State Recreational Use Statutes
ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-20 to -28 (1991)
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.200 (Michie 2000)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (West Supp. 2000)
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to -307 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2001)
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 846, 846.1 (West Supp. 2001), repealed by
Stats.1933, ch.744, p.1904, § 198.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-41-101 to -106 (West 1998)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to -557k (West 1991)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 5901C5907 (1991)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (West 2000)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-1 (1997), 51-3-20 to -26 (1982)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 520-1 to -8 (Michie 2000)
IDAHO CODE § 36-1604 (Michie Supp. 2001)
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 - 65/7 (West 1993)
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-22-10-2 to -2.5 (Michie Supp. 2000)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 461C.1C.7 (West 1997)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (1994 & Supp. 1999)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.645 (Banks-Baldwin 1996), 411.190
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1999)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2791, 9:2795 (West 1997)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp. 1999)
MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § § 5-1101 to - 1109 (2000)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West Supp. 2001)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West 1999)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.20C.27 (West 2000)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -27 (1999)
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.345C.348 (West 2000)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-16-301 to -302 (1999)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729 to -736 (1998 & Supp. 1999)
NEV. REV. STAT. 41.510 (1999)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (1989)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to -10 (West 2000)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (Michie 1995)
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1989)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to -4 (1999)
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N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 (1999)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18C. 181 (Anderson 1996)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1301-315 (West Supp. 2001), tit. 76," 5, 11
(West 1995)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.670C.696 (1990 & Supp. 1998)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to -8 (West 1994)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (1994 & Supp. 2000)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1991)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-12 to -18 (Michie 1995)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-101 to -105 (1995)
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.00 1C.004 (Vernon 1997
& Supp. 2001)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to -7 (Supp. 2000)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 5791C5795 (Supp. 1999)
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509 (Michie 1997)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.200C.210 (West 1988 & Supp. 2001)
W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to -7 (Michie 1997)
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.52, 895.525 (West Supp. 2000)
WYO. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to -106 (Michie 2001)
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Appendix 2:
Remuneration that Compromises the Protection
Offered by the State Recreational Use Statute
AL consideration for commercial activities and maintenance fees by
landowners where the primary use is for public recreational
purposes C ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-21(5), 35-115-22 (1991)
AK a responsibility to compensate C ALASKA STAT. §
09.65.200(a)(2) (2000)
AZ admission fee or consideration to travel across or enter upon
premises, but allows nominal fees by public entities and
nonprofit corporations to offset the cost of providing the
recreational or educational services C Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
33-1551(C)(1) (West Supp. 2000)
AR an admission fee to enter or use property, but allows sharing of
products and contributions in kind to offset costs and eliminate
losses and leasing to the state or subdivision thereof C ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18-11-302(4)(B), 18-11-307(2) (Michie 1987
& Supp. 1999)
CA consideration except consideration from the state C CAL. CIv.
CODE § 846 (West Supp. 2001) repealed by Stats.1933,
ch.744, p.1904, § 198.
CO consideration paid for entry upon or use of land or facilities, but
allows consideration for lands leased to a public entity and
consideration from federal government agencies C COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-41-102(1), 33-41-104(1)(b) (West 1998)
CT charge, rent, fee or other commercial service asked in return for
invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land, except that
charges for harvesting less than 100 cords of firewood are
allowed C CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557g(b), 552-
557k(c) (West 1991)
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DE the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, except consideration
from leasing lands to the state or subdivision thereof is
permitted C DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5902(4), 5906 (1991)
FL charge to enter or use land or where profit is derived from the
patronage of the general public C FLA. STAT. ANN. §
375.251(2)(b) (Harrison 2000).
GA the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, but property owners
and others who give permission to persons to hunt may collect
charges, and consideration from leasing lands to the state is
permitted C GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-24, 51-3-25, 27-3-1
(1982 & 1997)
HI the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, except consideration
from leasing lands to the state or subdivision thereof is
permitted C HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 520-2, 520-5 (Michie 2000)
ID any charge, except consideration from leasing lands to the state
or subdivision thereof is permitted C IDAHO CODE § 36-1604(a,
d, e) (Supp. 2001)
IL an admission fee for permission to go upon land, but a charge
does not include sharing of game or fish, contributions in kind,
cash made for the purpose of properly conserving the land, or
consideration from leasing lands to the state or subdivision
thereof is permitted C 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(d),
65/5 (West 1993)
IN a fee or other charge for permission to go upon land but
monetary consideration does not include sharing of game or
fish, services rendered for wildlife management, or contributions
in kind made for the purpose of wildlife management C IND.
CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-2.5(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 2000)
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IA any consideration, the admission price or fee asked in return for
invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land, except
consideration from leasing lands to a government is permitted
C IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 461C.2(1), 461C.6(2) (West 1997)
KS the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, with exceptions for
leasing lands to the state or subdivision thereof C KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-3202(d), 58-3205 (1994 & Supp. 1999)
KY the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, with exceptions for
leasing lands to the state or subdivision thereof C KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 150.645 (Banks-Baldwin 1996), 411.190
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1999)
LA the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to use
lands, except consideration from leasing lands to a government
is permitted C LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795(A)(4) & (C)
(West 1997)
ME a consideration other than consideration paid by the state or
when the premises are not used primarily for commercial
recreational purposes and the user was not granted exclusive
right to use the premises for recreational purposes C ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A(4)(B) (West Supp. 1999)
MD price or fee asked for services, entertainment, recreation
performed, or products offered for sale on land or in return for
invitation or permission to enter or go upon land, with
exceptions for sharing of products, benefits to land,
contributions for management or conservation of resources, and
leasing lands to the state of subdivisions thereof C MD. CODE
ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 5-1101(b), 5-1105 (2000)
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MA a charge or fee to use land except voluntary payments not
required to be made to use such land C MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 21, § 17C (West Supp. 2001)
MI valuable consideration C MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §
324.73301 (1) (West 1999)
MN any admission price asked or charged for services,
entertainment, recreational use, or other activity or the offering
of products for sale by a profit enterprise directly related to the
use of the land, except consideration from leasing lands to the
state or subdivision thereof and consideration for dedicated
recreational and trail properties by municipal power agencies
are permitted C MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.21(2), 604A.24
(West 2000)
MS any fee to enter or use land or area, or if a concession is
operated, except certain consideration from governments is
permitted C MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-7, 89-2-27 (1999)
MO the admission price or fee, or an invitation for the purpose of
sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering
business purposes C Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.345(1) (West
2000)
MT a valuable consideration C MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302(1)
(1999)
NE amount of money asked in return for an invitation to enter or go
upon the land, but rental paid by a group, organization,
corporation, or state or federal government shall not be deemed
a charge C NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729, 37-734(2) (1998 &
Supp. 1999)
NV consideration other than consideration from the state or
subdivision thereof or for a game tag C NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.510(3)(a)(2) (1999)
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NH consideration other than consideration from the state C N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 212:34(III)(b) (1989)
NJ consideration other than consideration from the state C N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-4(b) (West 2000)
NM consideration paid other than consideration from a government
or governmental agency C N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7(A)
(Michie 1995)
NY consideration other than consideration from the state or federal
government C N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103(2)(b)
(McKinney 1989)
NC a price or fee for services, entertainment, recreation performed,
or products offered for sale on land, but allows contributions for
remedying damages caused by education or recreational use,
removing certain hazards, and property tax abatement C N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-2(1), 38A-3 (1999)
ND the amount of money asked inreturn for invitation to enter or
go upon the land, with an exception for leased land to state or
political subdivisions C N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01(1), 53-
08-04 (1999)
OH consideration other than consideration from the state or an
agency of the state C Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18(B)
(Anderson 1996)
OK admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter, or whenever any commercial activity for
profit is conducted, except for governmental license or permit
fees and land for farming or ranching activities C OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 2, § 1301-315 (West Supp. 2001), tit. 76, § 5 (West
1995)
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OR the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to enter
or go upon the land, except that charges of no more than $20
per cord for permission to use the land for woodcutting are
permitted C OR. REV. STAT. § § 105.672, 105.688(2)(C) (1990
& Supp. 1998)
PA the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, except consideration
from leasing lands to the state or subdivisions is permitted C PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-2(4), 477-5 (West 1994)
RI the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, except leasing lands to
the state is permitted C R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-2(1), 32-6-4
(1994 & Supp. 2000)
SC the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land, except leasing lands to
the state is permitted C S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-20(d), 27-3-
50 (Law. Co-op. 1991)
SD admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land or nonmonetary gift of
less than $100, except leasing lands to the state is permitted and
governmental incentive payments C S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
20-9-12(1), 20-9-15, 20-9-16 (Michie 1995)
TN consideration other than consideration from the state or federal
government or governmental agency C TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-
7-104(2) (1995)
TX charge for entry, but permits charges if they are less than an
amount as determined by the premises' ad valorem taxes or
there is adequate liability insurance coverage C TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.003(2)(Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2000)
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UT the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to enter
or go upon the land or for a nominal fee of not more than $1,
except leasing lands to the state is permitted C UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 57-14-2(4), 57-14-4, 57-14-5 (Supp. 2000)
VT a price, fee or other charge in return for the permission to enter
upon or travel across the owner's land, but allows compensation
or benefits from permanent recreational use easements,
compensation for damages from recreational use, and
contributions for damages to offset or insure against damages
sustained by an owner C VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 5792(1)
(Supp. 1999)
VA payment for use of premises or engage in an activity, but not
including rentals or fees from governmental sources, incidental
sales of forest products, qualified actions to improve the land or
access, or remedying certain damages C VA. CODE ANN. §
29.1-509(A) (Michie 1997)
WA a fee except providers may charge an administrative fee of up to
$25 for the removal of firewood C WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.210(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 2001)
WV consideration from a government or governmental agency, or
money asked in return for an invitation to enter or go upon the
land but a one-time of $50 or less per year is permitted and
funds for leasing lands to governments C W. VA. CODE ANN. § §
19-25-4, 19-25-5(1)(A) (Michie 2001)
WI collection of money, goods or services exceeding $2,000 per
year, but donations for management and conservation of
resources, payment of not more than $5 per person per day to
gather products, payments from governments, and payments
from nonprofit organizations for recreational agreements are not
included C WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West Supp. 2000)
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WY the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to enter
or go upon the land, except leasing lands to the state is
permitted C WYO. STAT. ANN. § § 34-19-101 (a)(iv), 34-19-104
(Michie 2001)
